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the probability of domino effect decreases with the distance and diameter of the source pipe, and 
increases with the diameter of the target pipe. The frequency of the domino effect can be estimated 
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always higher than the individual frequency of this pipe, allows obtaining more realistic risk analysis 
results. 
HIGHLIGHTS 
 
 In parallel pipelines domino effect can have a significant influence. 
 Domino effect will be originated by jet erosion or jet fire impingement. 
 The domino effect probability depends on the geometric arrangement of the 
system. 
 A mathematical model has been developed to estimate domino effect 
probability. 
 This probability allows a more realistic estimation of failure frequencies. 
 
*Highlights (for review)
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ABSTRACT 
 
Parallel pipelines are frequently installed over long distances, due to the difficulty in 
creating or maintaining the required corridor. This implies that a release in one pipeline 
can seriously affect another one. The main risks associated with this domino effect are 
erosion by fluid-sand jets and the thermal action of jet fires. In this paper a survey has 
been performed on the accidents that have occurred, and the diverse associated domino 
sequences are analyzed. The probability of occurrence of domino effect is a function of 
the location of the hole, the jet direction and solid angle, the diameter of both pipelines 
and the distance between them. A mathematical model has been developed to estimate 
this probability. The model shows how the probability of domino effect decreases with 
the distance and diameter of the source pipe, and increases with the diameter of the 
target pipe. Its frequency can be estimated from this probability and from the frequency 
of the initiating pipe failure plus, in the case of jet fire impingement, the probability of 
ignition. The frequency of the target pipe failure thus calculated, always higher than its 
individual frequency, allows a more realistic risk analysis.  
 
Keywords: Jet impingement, Jet fire, Pipe erosion, Impingement modeling. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Pipelines are the most important and safe way to transport huge amounts of oil and 
other fluids to large distances, and to distribute them to the points where they are used. 
It is a relatively safe system; however, loss of containment events occur from time to 
time, due to bulldozers, corrosion, aging, landslides, etc. In such cases, a huge amount 
of flammable material can be released and this can lead to major accidents (i.e. 
explosions, fires environmental pollution). 
 
While most accidents have occurred because of the aforementioned causes, in some of 
them the severity of the event has been increased due to the so-called domino effect [1]. 
Domino effect can enlarge the scale of an accident and the severity of its consequences. 
This can be especially important in industrial plants, due to the closeness of the diverse 
equipment units [2].  
 
In the case of pipelines the situation is essentially different, as usually there are neither 
vessels nor other units in the near field. However, pipelines lay out over many 
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kilometers crossing the country through forests, rivers and urban zones and, therefore, a 
hallway must be designed to allow this path. Such a hallway is often difficult to 
establish and it can be very expensive, and in many cases it is used for more than one 
pipe. Thus, parallel pipes, sometimes with a short separation between them, transporting 
gas, oil or water over long distances can be often found. The same situation exists in 
urban zones, where kilometers of pipes conveying gas, petrol or water are buried, 
together with other services such as electric wiring. Underground hallways in densely 
inhabited urban zones have sometimes a dense arrangement of parallel and crossing 
pipes and utilities, and this implies a certain risk associated to the potential interaction 
of these systems [3, 4]. 
 
In these situations, it is possible that a loss of containment occurred in a pipe affects 
another close pipe. This has happened in diverse accidents, with severe consequences on 
people or with environmental impact.  
 
Several authors have assessed the impact of high pressure releases in parallel-running 
pipelines. Mohsin et al. [5] studied the underground natural gas pipeline safety 
distances, analyzing the possible outcomes of an accident associated with high-pressure 
water issuing from a pipe. Mazzola [6] assessed the consequences of high pressure 
releases of flammable gas from different rupture sizes in two parallel natural gas 
pipelines. Other authors [7–16] have focused on the metallurgical failure analysis of 
specific accidents in pipelines, caused by the action of a high-pressure jet issuing from a 
source pipe and damaging a second one. Wang et al. [17] analyzed the possible domino 
effect, in the event of the release from a pipeline, associated to thermal radiation, blast 
and ejected fragments. 
 
However, none of these authors has attempted to develop a model allowing the 
assessment of how this domino effect can affect the frequency of failure of a given 
pipelines system. Such a tool would be quite useful for the risk analysis of pipeline 
transportation systems. 
 
In this paper, a novel approach for the assessment of domino effect in pipelines is 
developed. Based on a historical survey of pipeline accidents, a mathematical model is 
proposed to estimate the probability of domino effect in parallel pipelines, aerial or 
buried, associated to a jet and to the resulting erosion or thermal effects. The model has 
been applied to two different accidental scenarios. 
 
2. A survey of domino effect accidents in pipelines 
 
After a literature search, eight cases have been found of accidents involving parallel 
pipes accidents occurred in smaller urban pipes have not been included, nor accidents 
generated by other services (e.g. electrical lines). The available information has been 
summarized in Table 1. 
 
Natural gas was involved in seven accidents. The source pipeline conveyed water (four 
cases), natural gas (three cases) or oil (one case). In three cases three pipes were 
involved. The initial loss of containment in the source pipe was caused by corrosion or 
sabotage (two cases). Once the first jet of fluid appeared, the time to failure of the target 
pipe was known in one of the cases (80 min).  The distances between both pipes ranged 
between 6 and 0.05 m. 
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In three cases the failure of the target pipeline was due to a jet fire from oil (one case) or 
natural gas (two cases) release. In one of the natural gas jet fire cases, the distance 
between both pipes was 7.9 m and the time to failure was 20 min.  
 
The features of these cases are essentially different from those found in the domino 
effect sequences occurred in process/storage plants, even though there can be some 
coincidence. In the case of plants, a significant number of equipment (vessels, columns, 
piping…) are located on a relatively reduced area, with rather short separation distances. 
This means that thermal radiation, overpressure or ejected fragments have a high 
probability of reaching a vulnerable element, often a vessel. Among the significant 
differences with respect to the domino accidents in pipelines, the following can be 
emphasized [1, 2]: the main initial causes in plants are mechanical failure and human 
factor, while the contribution of corrosion (quite important in pipelines) is very low; 
furthermore, only 10% of the initiating events occurred in on-plant pipes and associated 
valves. However, an aspect is relatively similar in both systems: the influence of 
“external events”, which in plants constitutes 30% of initiating events, while in 
pipelines “third party activities” (often excavating machinery) reaches approximately 
38%. 
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3. Domino effect possibilities 
 
Once a first release occurs, the possible domino effect can follow diverse sequences. 
If there is a hole in a pressurized pipe, the fluid will be released at a very high velocity. 
In the case of a gas, if  	⁄  > 1.9 the gas will exit at the sound velocity; for 
liquids or two-phase flow the velocity will be lower. This may have serious effects on 
other neighboring pipes, associated to erosion and thermal impact. However, the 
situation will depend on whether the pipelines are aerial or buried. Another important 
aspect is whether the fluid is or not flammable; if it is flammable, ignition is possible for 
aerial pipelines, and also for buried ones if the generation of a crater by the source jet 
allows it. And, finally, with buried pipes, the erosion will depend on the probable 
existence of an abrasive solid (sand or gravel). Majid et al. [22] performed tests to 
investigate the erosive wear of natural gas pipelines (API 5L X42 steel pipe) subjected 
to the action of a water-sand jet issuing from a 5 mm diameter orifice; they found a 
maximum wall thinning rate of 1.1 x 10-5 m hr-1.  
 
Another important aspect is the duration of the release. In aerial pipes, the loss of 
containment will probably be detected, while if they are buried, the detection will be 
more difficult. If the release is important, the decrease in flow rate or in pressure may 
indicate it. However, if it is relatively small, detection can be challenging and therefore 
the escape could be much longer (small release flow rates in water pipes are often 
disregarded). The diverse possible sequences have been summarized (Fig. 1). The final 
accidental scenarios of these sequences –pipe failure due to thermal impact, erosion or 
thermal/blast impact– have been established, based on the historical survey and risk 
analysis expertise. 
 
The initiating event is a release through a hole in the source pipe. There are two 
possibilities: aerial or buried pipes. In aerial pipes, if the released fluid is flammable and 
is ignited, there is a certain flames impingement probability on the target pipe. If this 
pipe conveys gas and it is not adequately fireproofed, the probability of failure in a 
rather short time is very high. Hemmatian et al. [23] have drawn attention to the high 
heat fluxes in the case of jet fire  impingement (see the values given in Section 5), and 
to the short time to failure (as short as a few minutes in some cases) that can occur when 
the heated wall is not wetted by a liquid. However, if the target pipe conveys a high 
flow at high pressure, the heat transfer coefficient to internal fluid could be sufficient to 
prevent failure. 
 
If the target pipe conveys two-phase flow, the possibility of pipe failure due to the high 
temperature reached by the pipe wall should also be considered. Instead, if the pipe 
conveys a liquid, this will cool the pipe wall avoiding pipe failure. However, the flow in 
the target pipe can be shut off if blocking valves are shutdown; this again could lead to 
pipe failure. Furthermore, if the jet fire flame shape is modified by a rather congested 
arrangement and flames engulf the target pipe –without any jet fire direct impingement-, 
then this pipe could stand [6]. If there is no flames impingement, the target pipe will 
probably not be affected. However, if it receives a strong thermal radiation –and it 
conveys a gas– it could still fail. 
 
If the released fluid is flammable and there is no immediate ignition, a flash-fire or an 
explosion is still possible (late ignition); in this case, both pipes could be damaged 
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(blast) or the target pipe could be affected by the jet fire following the fire flashing 
back. 
 
If both pipes are buried, the situation is somewhat different. If the release is flammable 
there is still the possibility of ignition, but only if the released jet or an explosion creates 
a crater. If this happens, the diverse sequences are similar to those commented 
previously. If there is no ignition but the jet impinges on the target pipe, it will entrain 
solid particles and the resulting fluid/solid jet will be highly abrasive. If the hole in the 
source pipe is small and the released flow rate is not detected, the probability that it will 
finally cause another release in the target pipe is rather high; even if there is no direct jet 
impingement, the fluid/solid blasting action could erode it [7], decreasing its thickness 
in such a way that it could be unable to stand the inside pressure and it would fail. 
Finally, if there is no immediate ignition but the released fluid is flammable, a flash-fire 
and/or an explosion can occur. This will happen if the released gas flows through the 
soil and enters into the atmosphere, or if a liquid after saturating the soil flows above 
ground and evaporates. If this happens and, furthermore, a crater has been formed, the 
fire will travel back to the fluid outlet and a jet fire will occur, with the consequent 
potential damage to the target pipe. 
 
4. Modeling jet impingement on the target pipe 
 
A jet issuing from a hole in a source pipe can affect a target pipe nearby depending on 
its direction and on the geometric configuration of the system: pipes diameters, distance 
between pipes and location of the hole in the source pipe. Let us consider a simple 
configuration of two pipes of equal dimensions. A jet can take many different directions 
(Fig. 2a) within a range of π radians (which corresponds to the plane tangent to the pipe 
wall at the hole location). At the same time, any hole located at the source pipe within 
the half of the perimeter adjacent to the secondary pipe, can impinge on the target (Fig. 
2b). The angle of the fluid jet  will change with fluid properties and environment 
circumstances [5, 24].  
 
Thus, the probability of jet impingement depends on i) the section of the perimeter of 
the source pipe where the presence of a hole may generate a jet impingement scenario 
and ii) the angle and direction of this jet. 
 
Let us consider the general case where two pipes (source pipe of radius r and target pipe 
of radius R) are located d meters apart (Fig. 3). We define Δ as the angle delimiting the 
section of the perimeter of the source pipe that can contain a hole issuing a jet that may 
impinge the target pipe. Any jet issuing from the arch delimited by the angular section 
2π-∆ will not impinge on the target. Δ can be expressed as a function of R, r and d by 
applying trigonometry relations to the shaded triangle of Fig. 3, as Δ is the conjugated 
angle of  (Δ and  are delimited by the external tangents to the two circumferences 
that represent both the source and the target pipe): 
 
∆ 2       (1)
 
Now, let us consider a one-dimensional jet issuing from a hole located at an angle  
within the ∆ circular section (Fig. 4). The overall angle of impingement (i.e. the range 
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
9 
 
of directions that the one-dimensional jet could take implying impingement) can be 
represented by 2 . 
 
The value of angle   can be deduced by analyzing the two contiguous triangles 
represented in Fig. 4: 
 
  arcsin √( ) (  2 *  (2)
 
Note that   may have some physical/geometrical restrictions in some regions of the arch 
delimited by Δ. These restrictions are related to the internal tangent between both pipes 
(Fig. 5). Let us name  the angle that references the position of the tangential point of 
the source pipe with one of the internal tangents between the circumferences 
representing both pipes.  in turn, splits the section of the source pipe perimeter 
delimited by Δ/2 into two arches: ,- and ,(. If a hole is formed within the arch ,( (Fig. 
4), 2  will not have any geometrical limit, since the tangent plane at the jet’s orifice 
will fall always below the internal tangent between pipes. If a hole is formed in the 
point of intersection between ,- and ,(, 2  will still be unrestricted, since 2  will seat 
on/be delimited by the internal tangent. However, if a hole is formed within ,-, the 
overall angle that a jet may cover will be always lower than 2 , because the tangent 
plane will be located above the internal tangent. This is the case illustrated at the bottom 
image of Fig. 5, where the angle . represents the narrow range that the jet direction may 
take issuing from a hole in ,-. 
 
4.1. Probability model 
 
To assess the probability of domino effect in pipelines, several aspects must be 
considered: the hole location, the jet direction and the solid angle that the jet is 
outlining. For the sake of simplicity, we propose a probability model for a one-
dimensional jet impingement (i.e. the solid angle of the jet will not be taken into 
account). Given two pipes (source pipe of radius r and target pipe of radius R, being r < 
R) with their centers separated d meters apart, the probability (P) that a jet issuing from 
the source pipe impinges on the target pipe is expressed by: 
   - * ( (3)
 
where - is the probability that a hole formed in the source pipe may imply a risk of 
impingement, and ( is the probability that a jet issuing from a hole with risk of 
impingement may actually have the appropriate direction to reach the target pipe. - is 
expressed as: 
 
-  ∆2 (4)
 ( will depend on the exact location of the hole within the arch delimited by Δ, whether 
it is within the ,- or ,( section. Let us define (/01 as the impingement probability of a 
jet issuing from a hole in ,(, and (/02 as the impingement probability of a jet issuing 
from a hole in ,-. 
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Following Eq. (2), (/01 can be written as: 
 
(/01  2  
2 arcsin 
3( ) (  2 * 01
  
(5)
 
where 01 is the angle delimiting the position of an orifice within ,( (Fig. 6). To 
simplify, we consider the orifice to be located at the medium of the segment ,(. Then: 
 012 
,(/22  (6)
 
and hence, 
 
01  ,(2 (7)
 
In turn, from Fig. 6, the following trigonometric relationships can be deduced: 
 
  	  )   (8)
 
  ,(  (9)
 
By combining the last two equations, the analytical solution for ,( and hence (/01 is 
completely defined: 
 
,(   * 	  )   (10)
 
Concerning (/02, it will be lower than (/01 due to the physical limits of β previously 
mentioned. Thus, it is reasonable to model this probability by: 
 (/02  5 * 	(/01 (11)
 
where q is a reduction factor ranging between 0 and 1. We have made an educated guess 
of q, based on the real configurations found in the literature review and on other 
arrangements (see Table 1, ID 3, 4, 5, and 6). We have found the angular values for the 
ranges of possible directions that a one-dimensional jet would take issuing from an 
orifice located at ,( 2⁄  (i.e. values of 2  of real configurations), as well as the same 
magnitude for a jet issuing from an orifice located at ,- 2⁄  (i.e. values of . for real 
configurations). The ratio between both values has given an estimation of q (mean value 
of 0.45). 
 
From (/02 and (/01, P2 can be expressed as the weighted combination of both: 
 (   * (/02 ) 61  8 * (/01 (12)
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with: 
 
  ,-,- ) ,( (13)
 
Finally, ,- can be: 
 
,-   * ∆2   (14)
 
4.2. Model performance 
 
The prediction from the model can be observed in Fig. 7. We have plotted the 
probability of jet impingement for diverse scenarios of source and target pipe of the 
same diameter (6, 12, 24, 36 and 48 inches), as a function of different effective pipe 
distances: 
 9    2 (15)
 
This model shows clearly how, as the distance between both pipes decreases, the 
probability of a domino effect on the target pipe increases. For example, for two pipes 
with D = 12 in, the probability of impingement is 0.135 for a distance ’ = 0.1 m, and 
decreases to 0.038 if the distance between pipes increases up to 1 m. The worst case 
analyzed (9 = 0.01 m) gives domino effect probabilities in the range 0.19-0.22. The 
probability is higher for the pipes with a larger diameter, due to the larger size of the 
target. For large separation distances (i.e. 10 m) –therefore with no possible domino 
effect– the theoretical probability is less than 3 x 10-3 for the 6 inches pipes scenario and 
less than 2 x 10-2 for the 48 inches pipes scenarios. Moreover, the probability is the 
same (P = 0.116) for all cases when the separation 9 is D (data not shown). 
 
The model has been developed for the general case of source pipes smaller (or equal) in 
diameter than target pipes. However, due to the symmetry of the geometrical system, 
the model can be easily rewritten for the cases where the source pipe is bigger than the 
target (Fig. 8). The summary of the modified equations to be used −together with 
original expressions (1), (3), (11), (12) and (13)− in these latter cases are as follows: 
 
-  1  ∆2 (16)
 
(/01 
2arcsin 
3( ) (  2 * 01
  
(17)
 
01  ,(2 (18)
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,(   * 	  )   (19)
 
,-   *   ∆2   (20)
 
In Fig. 9 we have plotted the variation of the probability of domino effect as a function 
of distance for four scenarios found in the literature review. Three of them (ID 3, 4, 5 
and 6) have source pipe diameters larger than the target, whereas the other one (ID 6) 
has the source pipe smaller than the target pipe. The latter scenario had a higher 
probability of domino effect (0.087) than the others, due to the shorter distance between 
pipes. Reported accidents occurred in Canada (1995) and Pakistan (2003 and 2004) had 
all probabilities lower than 1.5 x 10-2, all them with distances bigger than 6 m.  
 
The model developed allows us to explore differences between systems (Fig. 10 and 
Fig. 11). For a certain source pipe, the model shows how the probability of domino 
effect increases with the target pipe diameter, since the more target pipe surface exposed 
the more probable for a jet issuing from the source pipe to impinge. It can also explain 
the differences originated as a function of source pipe diameters. For instance, data in 
Figs. 10 and 11 show how for small target pipes (i.e. 6-12 inches) and short distances 
(less than 0.25 m) the probability of jet impingement is between 2 and 2.7 times bigger 
with a source pipe of 6 inch than with a source pipe of 48-in. For other cases (target 
pipes of 24-48 inch and distances from 0.5 to 1 m), the probability will still be bigger 
(1.3-2 times) for smaller source pipes, but less in absolute values. 
 
5. Jet fire 
 
If the released jet is flammable and the pipe is aerial or a crater has been formed, there 
is possibility of ignition. Ignition sources are often related to human activity, road 
traffic, etc.; therefore, the ignition probability will vary significantly with the 
environmental circumstances. If the jet is ignited, then a jet fire will occur. 
 
Jet fires are associated to very high heat fluxes as they entrain a large amount of air and 
the combustion is much better than in other accidental fires. The thermal effect on a 
given equipment or a pipe will be the one due to the thermal radiation if there is no 
direct contact with flames, or that associated to both radiation and convection if there is 
flames impingement.  
 
Although the thermal radiation decreases quickly with the distance, in some cases its 
effects on the pipe wall can be dangerous and can lead to failure. The worst case 
happens when there is flame impingement, as the thermal flux is very high; the 
following approximate values can be assumed [23, 25–27]: 
 
 Natural gas: 200 kW m-2, 
 Propane gas: 300 kW m-2, 
 Propane, two-phase: 180 kW m-2. 
 
Again, the possibility of impingement depends on the relative position of the source 
pipe hole and the target pipe. However, another element appears now: the lift-off 
distance. The lift-off is the centerline distance from the gas release point to the start of 
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the detached and stabilized flame; its magnitude can be determinant from the point of 
view of thermal domino effect. If a pipe is located at a distance from the source pipe 
that is shorter than the lift-off, the flames probably will not affect it. As for the 
maximum jet fire flames reach, it will be the length of the visible flame plus the lift-off.  
 
Diverse models have been proposed to predict the shape and size of jet fires. These 
variables can be described approximately in a simple way for vertical jet fires, but the 
situation becomes more complex when the jet fire is horizontal or inclined. In this case, 
the jet is straight, following the outlet jet main axis, while the high momentum controls 
it; however, it moves up due to buoyancy as the linear velocity inside it decreases. For 
the sake of simplicity, here only a simple vertical jet model is commented; in fact, for 
short distances it can also be applied to other orientations of jet fire. The following 
expressions have been proposed for propane jet fires [28–30]. 
 
Lift-off distance: 
 
;  6.4 ∙ @A ∙ BCBDE  (21)
 
Flame length: 
 ,  5.8 ∙ @A ∙ HI.(J (22)
 
The contour of jet fire flames is difficult to define. Accepting that it can be defined by 
the isotherm of 800 K –practically the Draper point– it can be assumed to be a cylinder 
with an “equivalent diameter” given by: 
 
KL  ,7 (23)
 
This model implies a conservative approach, as it predicts larger lengths than those 
designed for inclined or horizontal jets. It was obtained for the range 5 x 10-4 < Re < 
5·10-6. For higher Re values, more complex models should be applied [31]. 
 
Thus, for a given jet fire and source and target pipes system, there will be flames 
impingement if the jet fire is directed towards the target pipe and the distance between 
both pipes is in the range S < ′ ≤ (S+L) (see Fig. 12). 
 
With this simplified approach, the probability of target pipe failure can be estimated. If 
there is no flames impingement but only thermal radiation, the evaluation of the 
probability of serious damage on the target pipe is much more complex and is not 
treated here. 
 
6. Frequency of the domino effect 
 
The domino effect frequency can be estimated from the frequency of the initial release 
at the source pipe and the probability of damage to the target pipe. 
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Concerning the pipe failure frequencies, they will depend on several factors: pipe 
diameter, protection measures and location (in urban zones aggressions from third 
parties could be significant; in rural areas natural impacts such as landslides could be 
expected). Diverse institutions have proposed values taken from historical analyses; 
Table 2 shows average pipeline failure frequencies of PHMSA, TSB and CONCAWE 
databases (period 2004-2011). 
 
Table 2 
Pipeline failure frequencies (m-1 year-1). 
 
 PHMSA [32] TSB [33] CONCAWE [34] 
Full bore rupture 3.05 x 10-5 4.30 x 10-6 8.35 x 10-6 
Hole: d > 10 mm (maximum ½ DN) 9.71 x 10-5 1.37 x 10-5 2.66 x 10-5 
 
If A refers to the source pipe and B to the target pipe, the failure frequency of the target 
pipe, f(B)overall, can be calculated: 
 O6P8EQDAA  O6P/R8 ) O6P8 (24)
 
where f(B/A) is the failure frequency of target pipe due to a previous failure of the 
source pipe, and f(B) is the failure frequency of the target pipe, independently of the 
presence of the source pipe. 
 
f(B/A) is calculated from the pipeline failure frequencies of Table 2 and the probabilities 
previously explained, and f(B) is taken also from the values of Table 2, considering that 
initially each pipe has its own failure frequency, independently of the fact of being 
located together. Therefore: 
 O6P8EQDAA  O6R8 ∙ 	S	T→V ) O6P8 (25)
 
In the event of a jet fire, the ignition probability should also be introduced: 
 O6P8EQDAA  O6R8 ∙ 	S	T→V ∙ W ) O6P8 (26)
 
The ignition probability will depend on the existence of ignition sources and will 
change along the whole pipeline length, although sometimes an average value could be 
used. It will depend also on the conveyed fluid; for example, an average value of 2 x 10-
2
 has been proposed by EGIG [35] for natural gas, although for urban zones a minimum 
value of 0.7 is assumed and 0.8 is often applied. 
 
The following examples illustrate these calculations. 
 
General scenario: Two pipes, a 6-inch diameter pipe (source) and a 36-inch diameter 
pipe (target), @A = 20 mm in the source pipe. The release frequency in the source pipe 
is 9.71 x 10-5 m-1 year-1 (PHMSA). 
 
Case 1: Erosion by a jet. The two pipes are buried and separated by ′ = 0.25 m. The 
source pipe conveys water and the target pipe natural gas. 
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Case 2: Gas jet fire impingement. The two pipes are aerial and separated by ′ = 0.5 m. 
The source pipe conveys propane (20 ºC, 6 bar) and the target pipe natural gas. An 
ignition probability of 0.8 has been assumed. 
 
Eqs. (1-13) and (25-26) have been applied to calculate the impingement probability on 
the target pipe and the final failure frequency of this pipe. The values obtained for both 
cases are shown in Table 3. 
 
Table 3 
Impingement probability and failure frequency of target pipe. 
 
Variable Case 1 Case 2 
∆ 4.157 rad 3.897 rad 
  0.695 rad 0.492 rad 
(/01 0.442 0.313 
(/02 0.199 0.141 
5 0.45 0.45 
- 0.662 0.620 
( 0.295 0.232 
 0.195 0.144 
Lift-off n.a. (a) 
H - 3,827,200 
; - 0.25 m 
, - 6.9 m 
;	 ) 	, - 7.15 m  (b) 
KL - 0.98 m 
O6P8EQDAA 9.71·10-5 ·  0.195 + 9.71 ·10-5  = 1.16 ·10-4 m-1year-1 9.71·10
-5 
·0.144·  0.8 + 9.71·10-5  = 
1.08 ·10-4 m-1year-1 
(a)
 Assuming a choked flow (Pchoked = 3.4 bar, Tchoked = 272 K) with an outlet velocity of 243 m s-1 
(speed of sound). 
(b)
 The separation distance between both pipes is included in the range of S < ′ ≤ (S+L), so if the jet 
fire is directed towards the target pipe there will be flames impingement. 
n.a. Non applicable 
 
 
7. Conclusions 
 
The analysis of diverse accidents occurred confirm that when parallel pipelines are 
installed in the same hallway, the possibility of a loss of containment in one of them 
affecting the others should not be neglected. The so called domino effect has been 
observed to be associated to two potential damages: erosion by a fluid-soil abrasive jet 
in buried pipes, or thermal impact by a jet fire, mainly in aerial pipes, in the case of 
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flammable substances. This has an influence on the failure frequency of the system, 
which should not be neglected in a risk assessment. 
 
The analysis performed has shown that the overall failure frequency depends on the 
geometry of the system, i.e. pipes diameters and distance between pipes. A 
mathematical model has been developed to estimate the probability of domino effect in 
pipelines. It has been solved by applying an empirical component which has been 
established according to the configuration of the accidental scenarios found in the 
literature survey. It allows the analysis of the influence of the diverse variables on the 
domino effect probability. This probability has been observed to decrease as the 
distance between both pipes increases, and as the diameter of the target pipe decreases 
and the diameter of the source pipe increases. It has to be highlighted that for short 
separation distances and large diameters of the target pipe, the probability can reach 
significant values, between 0.2-0.3, which have relevant safety implications, since this 
probability straightly implies an increase of the overall pipeline failure frequency. 
Frequencies taking into consideration the probability of domino effect will provide 
more realistic and accurate risk analysis results, hence generally leading to safer 
outcomes. 
Further work will be devoted to improve the model in order to surpass their initial 
simplifications (i.e. one dimensional jet hypothesis, empirical component) and to 
enlarge its applicability by considering other already existing pipelines configurations 
like crossing pipes in urban zones.  
 
 
Notation 
   Distance between pipes centers, m ′  Effective distance, m K  Pipe diameter, m KL   Jet fire equivalent diameter, m @A  Hole diameter, m KX  Nominal diameter, inch or m O6R8  Source pipe failure frequency, m-1 year-1 O6P8, O6P8EQDAA Target pipe failure frequency, m-1 year-1 O6P/R8 Failure frequency of target pipe due to domino effect, m-1 year-1 ,  Jet flames length, m ,- Source pipe section delimited by internal and external tangents between 
both pipes, m ,( Source pipe section delimited by the internal tangent between pipes and 
the line linking their centers, m , 	S	T→V Probability of domino effect, - - Probability that a hole in the source pipe may imply impingement, - ( Probability that a jet from a hole with risk of impingement may reach the 
target pipe, - (/02  Impingement probability of a jet from a hole located in ,-, - (/01  Impingement probability of a jet from a hole located in ,(, - SWS Probability of jet impingement, - W Jet ignition probability, - 5  Reduction factor, - 
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33 
34 
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36 
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38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
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  Source pipe radius, m   Target pipe radius, m H  Reynolds number, -   Proportion factor - ;  Lift-off, m B  Velocity at the gas outlet, m·s-1 BDE  Average jet velocity, m·s-1 BC  Jet velocity at gas outlet, m·s-1 ∆ Angle formed by the external tangents of two pipes, delimiting a circular 
sector at the smallest pipe, rad   Jet angle jet, rad   Half solid angle of jet impingement, rad   Angle delimiting the position of a hole, rad 01  Angle delimiting the position of a hole within	,(, rad  Angle giving the intersection between ,- and ,(,	rad Z Angle formed by the external tangents of two pipes, delimiting a circular 
sector at the largest pipe, rad . Angle covering the narrow range that the jet direction may take issuing 
from a hole in ,- section, rad [  Dynamic viscosity, kg m-1 s-1 \  Density, kg m-3 
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FIGURE CAPTIONS 
 
Fig. 1. Domino effect sequences following a jet release from the source pipe. 
Fig. 2. Jet impingement between pipes of equal diameter. 
Fig. 3. Angular sector of the source pipe that can contain holes implying risk of 
impingement. 
Fig. 4. Overall angle covered by a jet that could affect the target pipe. 
Fig. 5. Physical limits of the overall angle that can be covered by a jet. 
Fig. 6. Selected geometrical variables concerning the probability model. 
Fig. 7. Domino effect probability as a function of the distance between source and target 
pipes with the same diameter, D. 
Fig. 8. Case of a source pipe with larger diameter than a target pipe. 
Fig. 9. Domino effect probability as a function of the distance between source and target 
pipes, for the configurations of Table 1 (ID 3, 4, 5 and 6). Symbols with open interiors 
correspond to real distances for each scenario. 
Fig. 10. Domino effect probability as a function of target diameter and distance between 
pipes for 6 in-diameter source pipe. 
Fig. 11. Domino effect probability as a function of target diameter and distance between 
pipes for 48 in-diameter source pipe. 
Fig. 12. Reach of jet fire flames. 
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Fig. 2.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3.  
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Fig. 4.  
 
 
 
 
Fig. 5.  
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Fig. 6.  
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 7.  
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Fig. 8.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 9.  
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Fig. 10.  
 
 
 
Fig. 11.  
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